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JOSEPH L. WEINER
Comparison between the reorganization practice of England
and of America has become common, and many desirable inno-
vations in our present practice have been the fruit of it. A com-
parison with reorganization of corporations in Germany has like-
wise many things to offer. A chief source of interest lies, prob-
ably, in the fact that the reorganized companies are industrial
corporations, whereas the reorganization of industrial corpora-
tions in America has been slighted by writers in favor of the more
spectacular and rather more uniform railroad reorganization.
Of more general interest is the striking parallel that exists at
bottom between reorganization here and there, the similarity of
the problems to be met, the similarity of the solutions, of the
complaints made by objectors to reorganization plans, and even
of judicial decisions. Lastly, the subject should prove interest-
ing to that part of the public, rapidly growing, which has con-
tact with German securities. The present and prospective posi-
tion of the United States as a capital market, with Germany one
of the most prominent bidders at that market, creates the im-
pression that the number of American holders of such securities
will be very large.
THE FACT BASIS
The reader who is familiar with American reorganizations
requires a few preliminary facts lest he draw conclusions rashly.
One such fact has already been noted, namely, that this discus-
sion deals with industrial enterprises, and almost never with
public utility corporations. In making comparisons, therefore,
it is important to exclude notions based solely on railroad re-
ceivership and reorganization, our most familiar exemplar.
If we take the year 1912, a sort of intermediate date, the
following picture of German stock corporations I presents itself:
a total of about 5,400; a total capitalization of about 18 billion
1 The corporation laws of Germany, like those of many other countries,
recognize two distinct forms of limited liability companies. In Germany
these are called the Aktiengesellschaft and the Gesellsehaft nit beschraenk-
ter Haftung. The latter was designed for that type of enterpriso which
was smaller in scope and which did not propose to finance itself by selling
securities to the general public. The present discussion is limited to the
reorganization of the Aktiengesellschaft, although the reorganization of
the Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung presents only slight variations.
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marks, almost all in one class of securities-hardly any preferred
stock. These companies have about 41 billions of bonds out-
standing, of which approximately half are secured by mortgage.
The chief thing to note about stock, besides the slight amount of
preferred stock, is that every share is entitled to one vote, and
with rare exceptions none is entitled to more than one vote.
Of more importance is the fact that in the promotion of cor-
porations in Germany the severe regulatory rules of the Cor-
poration Law, requiring an independent audit of property con-
tributed for stock, and placing responsibility on a large group of
participants for fraudulent promotions, and the even severer
rules that regulate the admission of securities to the exchanges,
-a total effect which may best be described as a different
system of promotion-have largely abolished stock-watering.
As a consequence an equity in the property is established which
has secured creditors to a degree exceeding that in this country,
and which partially accounts for the fact that most reorganiza-
tions in Germany are stockholders' reorganizations.
THE PROCEDURE IN GENERAL
The business procedure in the course of reorganization paral-
lels that in America, with the modifications made necessar.y by
a different system of jurisprudence. The usual committees are
often found, deposits are made (though rarely of stock-the rea-
sons for depositing bonds will appear later), the minority and
majority interests clash, and compromises are effected. A good
deal of the administrative side of our reorganizations can be dis-
pensed with, however, because of the legal devices used to en-
force a reorganization plan. In the first place, the whole pro-
cedure is usually'accomplished without the aid of a court. Until
1924 there was nothing in Germany corresponding to the equity
receivership which is frequently the first step in the reorganiza-
tions of corporations here. Hence, to prevent creditors from as-
serting their claims, private efforts are neces-ary to heep them
in line. Sometimes the pressure of banks will do this, sometimes
nothing will. This is a second factor which makes the German
reorganization preeminently a stockholders' reorganization.
Curiously enough, this lack of judicial machinery for coercing
general creditors, or forcing them to postpone their actions for
a time, is not true regarding bonds. By a statute of 1899 elab-
orate rules were established for calling meetings of bondhold-
ers, appointing a representative, voting on surrender of proper-
ty, reduction of interest, and on most of the other sacrifices usu-
ally sought of bondholders in reorganization.
With the absence of receivership there is also an absence of
the foreclosure and the transfer to a new company, wlich is
typical in our procedure. As in England, once the chief steps
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are decided on the rest is a matter of voting. This disposes
efficaciously enough of the stocks and bonds, but leaves the gen-
eral creditors in an extraordinarily favorable position. With
these preliminary facts in mind we can proceed to study the
types of reorganization in greater detail.
2
STOCKHbLDERS' REORGANIZATIONS
The great majority of the reorganizations in Germany are, as
was mentioned before, stockholders' reorganizations, i. e., the
rights of creditors are not affected. The balance sheet shows a
considerable deficit, the stock is selling below par, and credit is
bad. To remedy this situation, and to provide new money, it is
decided to reorganize.
At the next annual meeting, or at a special meeting called for
the purpose, the management proposes a plan of reorganization.
The proposal may take the following forms:
1. If new money is not needed, a simple reduction of the
capital stock may be proposed.3 This' would be the case if the
company had, for example, suffered a fire loss and had decided
that dividends should be paid while the loss was being amortized.
2 The unusual publicity required by German corporation law has resulted
in extremely able comment in the commercial part of the daily newspapers.
Two of them, the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG and the BERLINER TAGEBLATT,
enjoy an enviable reputation and are a mine of information. The financial
newspapers such as the BERLINER BOERSENZEITUNG naturally carry such
information and are always useful. 'Some of the economic journals make
a practice of balance sheet analysis; the best known are DER DEUTSCIIE
OEXONOI'IIST and PLUTUS (which has since changed into MAGAZIN DER
WIRTSCHAFT)., DER DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRT carries less material of this kind,
but what it has is good. Still another reliable source is WVIRTSCHAFrS-
DIENST, published by the Weltwirtschaftsarchiv at Hamburg. The annual
volumes of Saling's BOERSENPAPIERE and the HANDBUCH DE DEUTSCHEN
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN compare favorably with PeoR's and MIoDY'S.
MANNHEIMER, DI SANIERUNG (1924) is a good elementary survey, and the
chapters on reorganization in SCHDIALENBACII, FINANZIERUNGEN (3d ed.
1922) and WOLF AND BIRKENBIHL, DIE PRAXIS DER F1NANZIERUNG (5th ed.
1923) are interesting.
3 The statutory requirements for reducing or increasing the capital stock
are as follows: the resolution requires a majority equal to three-fourths
of the voting capital. If several classes of stock have been issued, the
resolution requires the separate approval of each class, besides the approval
by joint resolution (Commercial Code, § 288). The usual method for re-
ductions is to require the necessary proportion of shares to be handed in
for cancellation. Sometimes the nominal amount of each share is reduced;
in a few cases both methods were combined. The difficulty with reducing
the nominal amount was the provision of sec. 180 that bearer shares must
have a par value of at least 1000 marks, which was the usual par value
for which they were issued (since 1923 only 100 mark shares are re-
quired). Shares which are not presented may be declared void by the
company; an equivalent number of new shares is to be issued and sold by
the company, the proceeds to go to the owners of the old shares.
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Or, again, it may happen in a closely held corporation, such
as the Westinghouse Elekt-izitaetsgesellschaft, where the only
object was to remove the deficit from the books and the balance
sheet.4 Occasionally, one finds a reduction of capital stock ac-
companied by a sacrifice on the part of 'general creditors or
bondholders; this would indicate that the stockholders could not
be depended upon to contribute new money. But such cases are
rare5 In general the reorganization by a mere reduction of capi-
tal stock plays an unimportant role."
2. Another simple expedient is to ask for payment of a speci-
fied amount per share and to confer preferred rights upon those
shares upon which payment is made.7 This would indicate again
a situation which was not urgent, since such payments would be
totally inadequate if a company were in serious difficulties. For
that reason, this expedient was rarely resorted to,8 especially
since preferred stock was in bad repute, at least before the war.
4 Resolution in 1907. This is one of the distant echoes of the famous
Westinghouse reorganization. The same situation is present in the Zwei-
bruecker Exportbrauerei A. G. reduction of 200:1 in 1907. Schmalenbach
says that a case like this looks like an attempt to freeze out the small
stockholder, but the fact is that the entire capital stock was owned by the
Brauerei Loewenberg in Zweibruecken.
5 The Aquila A. G. was such a case. So were the Pommersbank and the
Preussenbank discussed infra pages 760, 761.
6 Sec. 240 of the Commercial Code requires the directors to call a meeting
of the shareholders -whenever it appears in the course of setting up an
annual or interim balance sheet that half of the nominal capital is lost.
This the directors are naturally loath to do. Hence, when that stage is
about to be reached, they prefer to suggest a reduction of capital stock,
pointing to the possibility of paying dividends, improving the market price,
and the like. Schmalenbach is of the opinion that most "pure" reorgani-
zations, ie., -where the only change is a reduction of the capital stock, are
due to this, citing the Duesseldorf-Ratinger Roehrenkesselfabrik reduction
of 5:3 in 1907.
7 The authority for this is spelled out of sec. 262: "For the covering of
deficits -which appear in the balance sheet a reserve fund is to be created.
To this fund are to be credited. . - - (3) The amount of payments
which are made by shareholders for granting of preferred rights on their
shares. . . ." It was contended formerly, especially by Staub in the
earlier editions of his CommENTARY, that unanimous consent was required
for granting of such rights on old shares, but this is now universally re-
jected; the regular majority for amending the articles of incorporation
suffices.
8 The Vereinigte Eisenbahn und Betriebsgesellschaft in Berlin, with a
capital of 5,000,000 marks, voted at an extraordinary meeting held on
September 30, 1902, to ask for payment of 300 marks per share. The
shares on which payment was made were to be 5 per cent cumulative pre-
ferred, and to participate in further earnings equally according to par
values. The shares were also to be preferred and participating on liquida-
tion. A shareholder pointed out at the meeting the great damage to thoze
who could not pay. The chairman answered that the new money was neces-
sary for the successful development of the company and that to assure it
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3. The typical proposal is a reduction of capital stock with
a proviso that those who pay a specified amount are free in
whole or in part from the reduction. Usually those who pay also
have their shares converted into preferred stock. The practice
varies. There may be a provision that upon certain conditions,
usually the payment of dividends for a number of years, the
preferred" rights shall cease.
This favorite form of reorganization 9 received a severe blow
in a leading decision of the Federal Supreme Court. The Maer-
kisch-Westfaelische Bergwerksverein, a lead and zinc mining and
smelting company organized in 1854, suffered severe losses from
a continued disruption of its market, beginning in 1896. These
losses reacted directly on the market price of its shares, which
declined from well above par in 1896 to 56 per cent in 1901, the
time of the proposed reorganization, having passed through a
low-water mark of 30 per cent.
The reorganization plan was as follows: Five old shares (par
value 600 marks per share), upon payment of 800 marks in
cash, were to be exchanged for two new preferred shares of
1000 marks each. The shareholders who did not exercise this
privilege were to have their holdings reduced in the ratio of four
to one. A resolution to this effect was attacked in the courts
and came to the Federal Supreme Court, which declared it ille-
gal.1
0
The court based its decision on the following considerations.
Section 211 of the Commercial Code limits the duty of a share-
holder to pay for this share to the nominal amount of the share.
This forbids further assessment. Pressure to pay a further
the greatest advantages must be offered; other suggestions had been con-
sidered and found not feasible.
Payment was made on 4598 shares oub of 5000. Two yearg later the
company voted to grant the preferred rights to the remaining common
stock upon payment of 400 marks on each share of common. Payment
was made on 224 shares, leaving a total of 178 common shares. See PAS-
sow, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (2d ed. 1922) 205-6. The Hoextersche Port-
land Zementfabrik reorganization in 1902 is another example of reorgani-
zation by payment against preferred' rights.
9 The literature on this form of reorganization is copious, but almost all
of it is legal. A discussion is certain to be found in all of the commentaries
on the Commercial Code under sec. 288 or 290, e.g., STAUB-PINNkrn, DU-
ERINGEI.-HACHENBURG, LEHMANN-RING, MAKOWER. Special volumes on the
subject were written by LEIST, SANXIERUNG DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
(1905); BRANTL, DIE SANIERUNG VON AKTiENGESELLS01IAFTEN (1908);
FISCHER, DAS SANIERUNGSPROBLEM (1911); ZADEK, DIE SANIERUNa (1916);
MEIER, Diz SANIERUNG (1918). The periodical literature can be found in
any of these books.
10 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zwilsachen (cited as R. G.) 50,
52. A lower court opinion to the same effect is reported in DEUTsCHE
JURISTEN ZEITUNG (1902) 153.
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assessment might be exerted by the corporation's refusing to
recognize a shareholder who declined to pay. This would clearly
be illegal; but pressure might also be exerted indirectly by
favoring the shareholders who pay, more than is justified by the
new money. Such compulsion is equally illegal. This was the
situation here; the shareholders who pay -surrender five old
shares totaling 3000 marks. In exchange they receive 2000 marks
in new shares less the 800 marks cash which they pay, or a total
of 1200 marks. Their sacrifice on the old shares is therefore
sixty per cent. But the shareholders who do not pay are asked
to sacrifice seventy-five per cent. Justice requires that the re-
duction be the same for all.
This decision is the Boyd case 11 of German reorganization,
and its critics use, in the main, arguments familiar in the Boyd
case discussions.22 According to the court below,1 3 equality means
equality of opportunity. Since it was open to all shareholders to
participate on the same terms, there was no discrimination
as against any, and aside from discrimination there could be
no question of compulsion. This familiar doctrine requires no
further elucidation. Another criticism offered resembled the
argument in the Boyd case: no reorganization would succeed
without some kind of compulsion and hence the court "required
the impossible." A few dissenters raised the question of "up-
setting well-known and long acted-on arrangements."
Still another criticism is from the viewpoint of what might
be called the equity of the situation. It contends that the hazard
involved in the payment of new money may be totally dispropor-
tionate to the advantage derived from the more favorable treat-
ment of the payer's old shares. Not all reorganizations are suc-
cessful; the payers of new money deserve some kind of compen-
sation.
The former objections were carefully considered and found
wanting by the Federal Supreme Court. The latter are not so
easily disposed of. It is pointed out by Schmalenbach that the
equality required by the court is short-sighted. It would amount
to real equality only where the reduction brought the market
n Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 432, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (1913).
Discussions of this case are legion; to those cited in Weiner, Conflictig
Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization (1927) 27 COL.
L. REv. 132, there have since been added Swaine, Reorganization of Cor-
porations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade (1927) 27 COL. L. RGv.
901; Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of the Priority Righta
of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization (1928) 28 COL. L. REv.
127.
22No attempt is made to give the source of any of these arguments. The
curious reader can find them in the literature cited supra notes 2 and 9.
13Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte, 4,230. Also reported in
DEUTSCHE JURISTEN ZELTUNG (1902) 179.
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price of the shares to par. If the market price of the shares
before the reduction is 67, then a reduction of 4:3 is not the same
as a payment of 25; it is in fact a disadvantage to the payer,
whereas a reduction of 2:1, or payment of 50, is a disadvantage
to the non-payer. A similar criticism uses the same technique
but employs as its point of approach the "intrinsic" (book) value
of the shares.
The court adverts to some of these latter points in a later
decision,24 where it makes its position more specific. That the
future may not show success, says the court, is not of judicial
interest. If that were not so, a court would be helpless in the
face of any imposition on the minority stockholder. It must as-
sume that the management has measured the adequacy of the
terms proposed to assure future success; beyond this it cannot
go.1" As to the equality required, the court disclaims the sug-
gestion that in a proper case it might look beyond the ratios of
par values of the securities to the ratio of their real values.0
In determining the ratio the par value only of the stock will be
considered. The reasons are largely that there is no other ade-
quate measure; the court will assume that the company is seek-
ing payment sufficient to restore the stock to its par value; the
same ratio must be taken for non-payers.
Other writers have called attention to the fact that the court's
decision sanctions the change of the stock from common to pre-
ferred. There is no doubt that the granting of preferred rights
introduces an incalculable factor in determining the validity of
any ratio. This is especially so since the preferred rights are
usually both cumulative and participating. The court justified
the granting of preferred. rights to the paying shareholders on
the ground that the Commercial Code sanctions the granting of
preferred rights in return for the payment of an assessment.
But here the court is clearly inconsistent. If it regards the new
money as a payment for the difference in amount of sharehold-
ing between paying and non-paying stockholders, as its notion
of ratio equality compels it to, no new money remains to be
counted as payment for preferred rights. If, on the other hand,
some part of this money is to be attributed to the granting of
preferred rights, the courts' fixed ratio is destroyed.
7
14 R. G. 80, 81.
5 The court probably meant that since the reorganizers told the paying
shareholders that the proposed measures meant future success, they would
be estopped from telling the contrary to non-payers.
16 This was especially the contention of Leist, who said that the court
would prohibit an excessive reduction even though the parity were other-
wise maintained.
17 A similar situation occurs in the United States where common stock
is given with a sale of bonds or preferred stock, and the court must decide
whether any value was given for the common. This difficulty persists even
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The legality of granting preferred rights on all the stock
given to those who pay the assessment is usually defended on
the ground that this is an issue of preferred for which the old
common is accepted at an agreed price. But although this prac-
tice is almost universal, the court refused to sanction the doc-
trine when presented to it in balder form. This case 21 involved
an issue of preferred with the proviso that an old shareholder
who subscribed for one share of the preferred would have pre-
ferred rights on two of his old shares. The court held this plan
void. Yet apparently the same result could have been reached
by the issuance of a preferred share of 3000 marks in exchange
for two old shares and 1000 marks in cash.
Despite the fears of reorganizers that the court's decision re-
quired the impossible, it soon developed that reorganization
could be carried out without revolutionary departures from the
norm to which industry was accustomed. The necessary changes
can readily be seen in the case of the Helios Elektrizitaetsgesell-
schaft.29 The original reorganization plan of this company was
drawn about the same time as that of the M.-W. Bergwerksver-
ein. It offered to stockholders the opportunity of exchanging two
out of every five shares, of 1000 marks each, for two new pre-
ferred shares of 1500 marks each, upon payment of 2050 marks
in cash. All unexchanged shares were to be reduced in the ratio
of 4:1.20 The resemblance to the M.-W, plan, which was held in-
valid by the Supreme Court, is striking and both follow the model
where the common stock is without par value. See Stone v. Yozung 210
App. Div. 303, 206 N. Y. Supp. 95 (4th Dept. 1924), and contrast JoMn-
son v. Lounisville Trust Co., 293 Fed. 857 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), ccrtiorari
denied 264 U. S. 585, 44 Sup. Ct. 334; see WIC cERSnIM, STOCKI WITHOUT
'PAR VAI u (1927) 81 et seq.
is R. G. 76, 155. This ease involved a limited liability company (Ge-
sellsehaft mit beschra-enkter Haftung) rather than a stock corporation or
Akitiengesellsclaft. But the court said expressly that the principle was
the same.'
'9 There is an excellent discussion of this reorganization by Adolf Lev-
inger, Die Sanierung notleidender Aticrgelslschaften (1903) 110
SCHRITEN DES VEuRINS FUE SozIALroLrrm 40,a418. This reorganization
was unsuccessful and the company was forced to liquidate.
2 0 Payment might be made in bonds instead of cash, at 93 for the 4s and
4/,s, and 100 for the 5s. The market prices at the time were 70 and 77.
The market price of the stock was 25. The preferred stock was to have 6
per cent, the common 4 per cent, then both to share equally. The preferred
was to be cumulative, and entitled to prior payment on liquidation. Those
who thus converted their shares were also to have the right to subscribe to
all the preferred shares that remained. The bondholders objected to other
parts of the reorganization plan, namely, the granting of security to the
bank creditors. They formed a protective committee and succeeded in get-
ting equal terms with the banks. They also demanded that the stock be
reduced in the ratio of 5:1 and that all bond issues be accepted at the same
price.
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for reorganization before 1902.21 In view of the attack on the
M.-W. plan, the Helios company postponed action until after the
court's decision. Thereafter the plan was changed so that all
of the stock was first reduced in the ratio of 5:1. By paying
1000 marks in cash, and the same amount in the reduced com-
mon stock (equal to five old shares), the stockholder would re-
ceive a new preferred share of 2000 marks.21 The plan adopted
by the M.-W. Bergwerksverein, after its old one was held invalid,
is almost identical with that of Helios.22 And these cases have
set the pattern for all subsequent reorganizations.23
In form, therefore, the change is simply one from a qualified
reduction of capital stock to a combined reduction and increase.
The two may be combined in one resolution and may also be ef-
fectuated simultaneously.24 It is not necessary to use new certifi-
21 The preferred stock was entitled to 6 per cent cumulative dividends.
Of the remaining earnings, one-fourth was to go to the preferred, and the
rest divided equally according to par value between preferred and common.
No bonds were to be taken in exchange, but the paying shareholders might
exchange bonds in their possession for equal amounts of preferred.
22 By way of further illustration, one might add the reorganization of
the Jacobiwerk A. G. in Meissen in 1891. Payment of 100 marks was
asked of the shareholders for conversion into preferred shares (par value
300 marks). Others were reduced in the ratio of 3:1.
23 As these two cases show, the remedy was discovered soon after the
decision. The earliest application of it is said to have been in the Elber-
felder Papierfabrik A. G. reorganization of 1902; see a notice in the Reich-
sanzeiger a few months after the decision, reprinted in PASSOW, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 209-210, though the name of the company is not given.
2 4 Vereinigte Annweiler Brauerei A. G. reorganization of 1901. The first
reorganization of the Danziger Oelmuehle A. G. in 1902 was probably com-
pleted at about the time of the court decision since it is a clear violation
of it. The shareholders were asked to subscribe for new preferred in the
ratio of two to one, either by paying 100 marks in cash or by exchanging
3000 marks par of common stock and 500 marks in cash; remaining com-
mon was reduced in ratio of 15:1. Those which were not turned in were
according to the provisions of the statute (Commercial Code, § 290) de-
clared void and the proceeds of the sale of an equivalent amount of new
shares given to the stockholders. The proceeds amounted to one-twentieth
of the par value.
In the Stettin-Gristower Cementges. reorganization of 1904, the pre-
ferred were asked to pay 400 marks per share and the common 700 marks;
those who paid became Preferred Lit. A; the others were reduced 5:3.
The result was 93 common shares, 321 old preferred shares, and 808 new
preferred. In the first reorganization in 1902, payment of 300 marks was
asked for conversion into preferred. The figures for the second reorganiza-
tion indicate that in the company's opinion the relative status had not
changed in the interim. A discussion of the second reorganization will be
found in the BERLINER MORGENPOST for March 4, 1904. The company was
unsuccessful and its assets were transferred to the Stettin-Bredower Port-
land Cement Co. in consideration of the assumption of a 600,000 mark
mortgage and 500,000 marks in shares.
The Duetsche Seidenspinnerei A. G. in Raupenheim reorganized in 1905,
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cates for the increase; the old ones, which are handed in for
the reduction, will do just as well. And in the simple case of a
reduction of 2:1, or payment of 50 per cent, the stockholder who
makes the payment may be left in undisturbed possession of his
old shares, possibly with some notation to indicate that payment
has been made.
The change in substance is more difficult to evaluate. Certain
things are clear, namely, that a reorganization plan calling for
payment of 5 per cent with a reduction of 6:1 for non-payers--a
plan not uncommon before the decision 2 .--is definitely banned.
On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the stockholders of
Helios who did not pay the assessment were much happier under
the new plan than under the old. The protection afforded by the
court's ratio depends entirely on the extent to which the stock of
the shareholders who pay is buttressed with preferred rights.
Since the preference rights are usually extensive and since they
apply both to the old and the new shares of the paying share-
holders, the non-payer is still at a genuine disadvantage.
The result, as here pictured, coincides substantially with that
of the Boyd case.2 The latter also eliminates the extreme case-
the entire exclusion of general creditors from participation in
the reorganized company. But, as developments since it was
decided show,2 7 it by no means guarantees them a substantial
interest, much less the payment of their claims.
Some of the variations presented by different reorganizations
can be briefly summarized. In a few instances the new shares
issued were not given preferred rights, another indication of the
dislike for preferred shares where they can be avoided. The
Stahl and Eisenwerke Dalhausen A. G. did not offer its new
shares directly to the stockholders, but indirectly through a
bank; in a few other instances the new subscriptions were un-
derwritten.
Where there is no expectation that the small stockholder will
either by reduction of 3:2 or payment of one-third and conversion into
6 per cent cumulative preferred. Payments were made on 1269 shares;
3 were purchased and destroyed; the remaining 1728 shares were reduced
to 576. To restore the capital stock to its original figure, 1155 preferred
shares were turned over to a bank consortium which offered them to the
stockholders for subscription.
25 This was the resolution held invalid in the lower court opinion cited
supra note 10. Theoretically a similar result can be achieved by an in-
ordinate reduction accompanied by the issue of new shares at par to those
stockholders who wish to pay the assessment. But such a course is highly
inexpedient and, despite the positive assertion of its validity, may prove
judicially unwise. The courts seem, however, to have allowed wide lati-
tude to reductions. See 14 LEPZIGER ZnrrSCHRr 63, and criticism in the
last chapter of PINNEP, BEITRAEG ZUm AXTiENRECHT (1918).
- Supra note 11.
27 Ibid.
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contribute his proportionate share of the new money, and occa-
sionally for other reasons, the shares will be issued to a large
stockholder or a parent corporation.28 In case this source of new
money is als6 dry, the increased stock may be offered to an out-
side group,29 though this device is naturally resorted to only in
extremis. In a few cases the stockholders were asked to sub-
scribe, not for new stock, but for a bond issue,30 but this variation
is much less frequent in Germany than in America.
It has happened in a number of instances that at the time of
the reorganization the promoters of the enterprise were charged
with having overvalued the property originally. Either because
of a burdened conscience, or to avoid possible or actual litigation,
the promoters have sometimes been known to place a block of
shares at the disposal of the company.31 This naturally, facili-
tates the reorganization as it lightens the burden of the other
shareholders. Where the stock is all in the hands of one group,
as in the Elektrische Strassenbahn Bamberg, a surrender of
some of the shares has little significance.
28 Examples are the purchase of part of the Ufa's new shares by the
Deutsche Bank, and the Schoendorff family (Karstadt Konzern) pur-
chase of part of the new shares of the Gebrueder Schoendorff A. G. in
Dusseldorf.
The Ostdeutsche Stanz-und Emaillierwerke A. G. belonged to the Stinnes
group. After the capital was reduced it was increased by twice the amount
remaining, with a proviso that the shares not subscribed for by the old
stockholders were to be put at the disposal of the Hugo Stinnes firm in
Muehlheim.
After the capital stock reduction of the Siemens Elektrische Betriebe
A. G. was completed, the Prussian government bought a mviority of the
shares and subscribed for a capital increase of 4 million at par. This was
all the more noteworthy since the stock was then selling at 62. The name
of the company was changed to Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke A.G.
29 Part of the Ufa stock was thus sold. Compare also Hannoverscho
Waggonfabrik A. G. and Rheinische Metallwaren u. Maschinenfabrik, infra
page 766.
, 3O The second reorganization of the Danziger 0elmuehle was effected by
means of a 1,000,000 mark bond issue (5 per cent) to stockholders at 97.
Those who subscribed had their shares converted into preferred stock. The
other shares were reduced to one-third. This reoganization, like the prior
one of this company, raises legal doubts. See supra note 23.
The reorganization plan of the Koenigin Marienhuette A. G. in 1901
asked the shareholders (par value of share was 600 marks) to pay 100
marks per share in cash and to subscribe to the extent of 150 marks in a 41/
per cent bond issue at 105. The shareholders who complied had their
shares converted into 5 per cent non-cumulative participating preferred;
the others were reduced 2:1. A total of 8346 shares were converted; 1490
shares remained. The last quotation for the stock was about 28. The new
common was introduced on the exchange at 20, the preferred at 52.
31 The promoters of the Deutsch-oesterreichische Mannesmannroehren-
werke promised such a surrender of stock, repudiated, and finally per-
formed the promise with some modifications, after litigation was begun.
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The only cases that remain are those where all or part of the
new stock was offered to creditors or bondholders. This leads
us to the other groups of reorganization,--to those where the
rights of creditors have been affected. But before passing on
to these we might note the applicability of combined reduction
and increase of capital stock as a device in -American reorganiza-
tion. The situation is aptly described in a passage in Dewing:=
"An unusual but efficient and direct plan is followed by the
Massachusetts textile mills when they find their credit impaired.
The stockholders first authorize the reduction of the capital stock
by a certain proportion, possibly 50 per cent. This involves the
cutting of each stockholder's interest in half. They then author-
ize the sale of the stock surrendered at par to either the old
stockholders or outside bankers. The final result of these two
steps is a substantial increase in the available money, without
any increase whatever in either the amount of stock outstanding
or the direct liabilities. This method has been applied in other
reorganizations outside of New England, but in a less drastic
form. Its advantages lie in its simplicity and the slight disloca-
tion of the corporation's business which is likely to occur."
Why such reorganizations are unusual is not apparent; nor
does Dewing offer any explanation. One may hazard a guess
that our industrial companies usually allow the stage where
this sort of action suffices to pass, and perhaps necessitate a re-
ceivership. With the latter, more effective means may safely be
employed against the non-paying stockholder, and there is sel-
dom any great temptation to preserve the identity of the old cor-
poration.
BONDHOLDERS' REORGANIZATIONS
Readjustments of bondholders' claims are almost all effected
under a statute passed in 1899. This law, usually referred to as
the Bond Law (Schtuldverscircibu.n2gsgcsetz-), has for its full
title "Law concerning the Rights in Common of Owners of
32 DEWING, FINANCLL POLICY OF CORPo1NTIONS (2d'ed. 1926) 1112-3.
33 "An excellent example of this type of reorganization possessing a more
than local interest is the first reorganization of the Wcstinghous2 Electric
and Manufacturing Company in 1891. The company had grown very
rapidly. As a result its unsecured debt had attained threatening propor-
tions. The management conceived the wise plan of selling preferred stock
to the creditors and outside bankers, but were unwilling to merely increase
the outstanding capitalization. Accordingly, the Westinghouse Company
proposed that the stockholders should surrender 40 per cent of their hold-
ings to the company's treasury. The treasury stock thus obtained could
be made preferred and sold for the benefit of the company. Great difficulty
was experienced in persuading the stockholders to endure the sacrifice,
although it saved the company from threatened bankruptcy." Ibid. 1113 n.
The Westinghouse Company reorganization was somewhat different from
the type discussed thus far since it involved the funding of creditors' claims.
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Bonds." 34 It is applicable whenever bonds of a total nominal
amount of at least 300,000 marks are issued, whether secured or
unsecured, whether the debtor be an individual or a group or
corporation,31. so long as the bonds are all of one class, i.e., each
bondholder is granted equal rights corresponding to the nominal
amount of his holding.
The statute provides for meetings of the bondholders which
are the basis for all further action. They are to be called at the
instance of the debtor, and at his expense; but an application
may be made to the court by the holders of five per cent of the
outstanding bonds and the meeting called over the debtor's ob-
jections, though he has the right to be heard. The announcement
of the meeting must state its objects and the reasons for calling
it. By a majority vote of the amount represented a common
representative of the bondholders may be appointed, and by a
three-fourths vote the power of the individual bondholder to en-
force the rights arising from the obligation may be cut off. Reso-
lutions by which rights of bondholders are surrendered or re-
stricted may be adopted only for the preservation of the common
interests of the bondholders, and only to avoid the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the debtor. They require a three-fourths major-
ity of the votes cast. If the nominal amount outstanding does
not exceed twelve million marks, the affirming votes must repre-
sent at least two-thirds of such amount; if there are more than
twelve but less than sixteen millions outstanding, at least eight
million must approve; and if sixteen millions or more, at least
half. Resolutions so adopted are binding on all bondholders of
that class. They must, however, predicate equal rights for all
bonds; unequal treatment is permissible only with the express
- This act went into effect December 4, 1899. It had predecessors in
Austria and izl some of the German states, but apart from historical -or-
ganization of bondholders in the earlier commercial history of Europe the
chief model was the Companies Act of England. This model was greatly
enlarged upon. The theoretical difference between the German and the
English statutes is that the latter envisage simply a sacrifice made by
creditors for the avoidance of bankruptcy, whereas the former considers
the bondholders as forming an interested class or aggregate similar to
stockholders, meeting, appointing representatives, and adopting resolutions
for their common benefit. Such statutes play an increasingly important
role in European finance, especially since the war. Two interesting volumes
by EscAR A, L'ORGANISATION DES OBLIGATAIRES (1922) and L'ORGANISATION
LIGALE DES PORTEURS D'OBLIGATIONS (1919), discuss the various statutes
(the texts of which are all translated into French) and the precedents, be-
ginning with the Bank of Genoa organization in the fifteenth century.
The leading commentaries orn the German act are by KOENIGE (2d ed.
1922), and GOPPERT (2d ed. by Trendlenburg, 1915); further literature is
referred to in KOENIGE. See also SEELING, DIE INDUSTRIE-OBLIGATION
(1919).
35 With the exception of bonds issued by the Empire, a German state, or
a public corporation.
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consent of the bondholders who are discriminated against. Every
other agreement between the debtor or a third person and a bond-
holder, by which the latter is to be favored, is void. A resolution
which is brought about by favoring individual bondholders is not
binding on the others. The nominal capital claims of the bonds
cannot be affected by resolution (e. g., the "par value" may not
be reduced, nor may the bonds be converted into some kind of
stock interest), nor can the bondholders be obligated to make
payments of any kind.
This statute eliminates the necessity for majority provisions
such as are found in Canadian mortgages -" and to an increasing
extent in our own.37 As a result, the German trust indenture is
an extremely short and simple affair.
In practice the procedure is to call a meeting of the bond-
holders in the manner prescribed by the statute. At this meet-
ing the bondholders appoint one or more representatives. The
usual choice is a trust company, which acts as the financial ad-
viser, checks the books of the company, and the like, and in-
dividuals who are more specifically to represent the interests of
the bondholders and to draw a reorganization plan. At the same
time the power of the individual bondholder to enforce his claim
against the company is cut off. If the danger of a default is
pressing, the interest payments for the next quarter or half-year
may be waived or deferred.:" A plan of reorganization is then
drawn by a committee of the parties- interested, and submitted
at a subsequent meeting. The bondholders, if they approve the
plan, will adopt it by appropriate resolutions, conditioned, per-
haps, upon the due performance by the stockholders of the terms
imposed upon them.
A great deal of difficulty is presented by the provision that the
capital claims of the bonds must not be disturbed. This makes
impossible the refunding of fixed charge securities into a pre-
ferred stock or other security of different capital nature or
amount. 9 As a result, other means must be employed when such
36 See Fraser, Reorganization of Companies in Canada (1927) 27 CoL
L. REv. 932.
37 Almost the sole discussion of such clauses is in two notes in (1927)
27 CoL. L. REv. 443, 579.
38 Since the power of the individual bondholders is excluded, it is not
obvious why this is necessary. The explanation lies in the fact that the
directors of corporations are under a duty to institute bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in case it appears that all of the capital is lost, or that the com-
pany is insolvent. The waiving of interest relieves the directors from this
duty and keeps the company out of the bankruptcy courts.
39 With the exception of income bonds--one such case is cited below. But
income bonds were almost unknown in Germany before the war and are
only slightly used today. Where they do appear, they provide for a fixed
charge with a possible further participation. See infra note 53.
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a change is imperative. In two instances this was done success-
fully. Both companies were mortgage banks, which were the
heaviest sufferers in the banking catastrophe of 1901. The Prus-
sian Mortgage Bank (Preussische Hypotheken Aktien-Bank) 41
suffered chiefly from huge real estate speculations. Intercor-
porate manipulations had concealed the true state of the com-
pany until it was well on its way to ruin. It appeared that of
more than 350 million marks of bonds in circulation a con-
siderable portion was not covered by adequate mortgage secur-
ity, nor could the interest required for the bonds be earned. Fin-
ally, the large Berlin banks 41 decided to help in disentangling the
affairs of the company, and called for deposit of the bonds. 41
The deposit agreement authorized the committee to exercise the
legal rights on the bonds, to close necessary contracts and trans,
act necessary business, to advance interest on the next two cou-
pons, to represent the bonds in bankruptcy if necessary, to con-
clude compromises, to participate in execution and foreclosure
sales, and to take measures to limit the rights of the bondholders
or to substitute a new" debtor. A general meeting of certificate
holders was to pass upon all measures involving surrender of
rights, by majority vote. The dissolution of the organization
could take place only at a meeting where one-half of the nominal
amount deposited was represented and only by resolution of
three-fourths of the amount voting.
43
A bondholders' meeting was held on Dec. 31, 1900 at which
305.5 of a total of 357.6 millions were represented (of which 290
had been deposited). Resolutions were adopted to pass the Janu-
4 An excellent discussion of the reorganizations of the Preussiche Hypo-
theken Aktienbank and the Pommersche Hypotheken Aktienbank by Ernst
Kritzler was published in (1903) 111 SCHRIFTEN DES VEREINS FUER SOZIAL-
POLITIK 3 et seq. Information for later years can be obtained in the annual
volumes of Saling's BOERSENPAPIERE and the HANDBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFEN. In discussing the reorganization of these tyo
banks the facts have been simplified, and the disentanglement of the re-
lations of the banks in question with their affiliated companies left entirely
out of account.
41 A number of the large mortgage banks, fearing the effect of a reor-
ganization on the market price of their own bonds, had offered to advance
15 millions if the affairs of the Preussenbank could thereby be disentangled.
It soon appeared, however, that the damage was worse than was estimated,
and the offer was withdrawn.
4 Deposits of bonds, or of any securities for that matter, are compara-
tively rare. Such deposits were made by the Helios bondholders. See
supra note 20. Occasionally stockholders have formed deposit committees
for protection of some common interests. See PASSOW, op. cit. supra note
8, at 160 et seq. In the famous case of the Hibernia mine they formed a
new corporation whose assets were the deposited shares.
43 An additional reason for advancing the interest was that the company
would have had to go into bankruptcy if the bondholders did not waive the
interest payment, and it was doubtful whether this could be done in time.
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ary and April interest (the two payments which the banks were
authorized to advance), to let the Deutsche Treuhand Gesell-
schaft enforce the rights of the bondholders, and to exclude
the power of the individual bondholders to bring suit against
the company.
For the reorganization the following things had to be borne in
mind:
1. 17.5 million marks had to be supplied in cash in order to
replenish the reserve fund required by the mortgage bank-law.
2. The two interest payments had to be provided for.
3. A stock capital equal to one-twentieth of the bonds in cir-
culation had to be provided for, as required by statute.
Two plans were proposed. The first involved reducing the
interest for the next ten years on the bonds by one-fifth; passing
the next two interest payments entirely, and issuing stock for
the subsequent eight interest payments (tvo years). At the same
time the old capital stock was to be cut to one-tenth, to go to
the old shareholders to secure their cooperation.
The alternative plan was first to reduce the stock in the same
way but then to increase it by an amount equal to 15 per cent of
the bonds. The new stock was to be offered to bondholders in
exchange for the surrender of 20 per cent of their bonds, the
interest on the remaining bonds to be paid in full. This plan
was considered more advantageous both for the bondholders and
for the company, but could not be imposed by a statutory pro-
ceeding since it involved reducing the nominal amount of the
bonds. Hence the first plan was approved at a new statutory
meeting. The certificate holders then met and unanimously
adopted the second plan with certain conditions. The stockhold-
ers agreed, and all but about seven millions of the bonds were in
fact refunded under the second plan.
The other case where the bondholders were induced to cut
down the amount of the bonds is that of the Pommersche Hypo-
theken Aktienbank, another mortgage bank which was in diffi-
culties at the same period. The bondholders' meeting took place
without any prior deposits, which may account for the fact that
the ultimate participation in the capital surrender was not as
great as that in the Preussenbank. With a view to further ad-
justment the bondholders agreed to reduce the next half-year's
interest and appointed the Darmstaedter Bank to draw a reor-
ganization plan. The following alternative proposals were made:
either a surrender of one-fourth of the interest permanently
with no interest whatever for about four years (for which inter-
est payments stock was to be issued) ; or the surrender of one-
4 See Hecht, Die Deutsche Treulmnd Geselschaft (1903) 111 Scarx
DES vEREINS FUER SozIALPoLrrIK 103, for the early history of this company.
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fifth of the capital amount of the bonds in exchange for stock
for half that sum. The latter would enable the company to set
up a reserve and in the event of success the amount thus surren-
dered was to be paid to the bondholders. The first proposal was
accepted with practical unanimity at the meeting that was called
to pass upon it, and then about three-fourths of the bondholders
individually accepted the alternative.
These two exceptional instances 45 indicate the procedure by
which bond principal may be cut down or converted in a reor-
ganization. The usual terms involve the passing of interest pay-
ments immediately due,"0 a permanent reduction of interest,"
and often a change in the amortization plan.48 For the purposes
of the reorganization part or all of the lien may be surrendered, 9
the maturity of the loan may be changed," or a loan which is due
compulsorily refunded.51 Occasionally, unsecured bondholders
succeed in getting a mortgage security in exchange for the sac-
rifices they make.2 In a few instances the reduction of interest
was coupled with an agreement to pay greater interest if
earned,5 3 almost the only examples of income bonds which existed
before the war in Germany.
A special difficulty arises in the application of the Act because
of the fact that if part of the bonds are due, either on account
of varying maturities or because bonds have been called for re-
demption, such bonds are classified separately and must be treat-
ed accordingly. Hence, if these bonds should not total 300,000
marks, the statute is not applicable to them and concerted action
with regard to them is impossible. Even if they total the re-
quired sum, their holders are comparatively more scattered and
it is difficult to get a sufficient amount represented at the meet-
ing. It is usual in practice to grant such bonds preferential
45 Compare the Deutsche Grundschuld Bank reorganization, infr page 768.
4 Blech u. Emaillierwerke; Siemens Elektrische Betriebe.
47Pommersche Hypotheken Aktienbank; Preussische Hypotheken Aktien'
bank; Aktienbrauerei Goblis in Leipzig.
48 Blech u. Emaillierwerke; Siemens Elektrische Betriebe.
49 This happens with great frequency; the trust indentures usually au-
thorize the trustee to release the security or part of it upon substitution of
securities of equal value, but this is inadequate to meet reorganization
needs.
50 This is always involved when the amortization plan is changed, but
sometimes the change is more radical, e.g., the treatment of the Siemens
Elektrische Betriebe bonds which had been called for redemption. See
infra note 51.
51 For example, in the reorganization of Siemens Elektrische Betriebe
there were many bonds called for redemption and therefore due. It was
agreed to pay these bonds in five installments. This was done by majority
vote, and was therefore binding on all.
52E.g., Helios reorganization.
53 Mecklenburg-Strelitzsche Hypothekenbank; and see supra note 39.
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treatment in the reorganization plan,5' although it is hard to
determine whether this is a recognition of an equitable claim,
or a bargain with a relatively unimportant group.
It would seem that the major difficulty, a reduction of the
capital amount of the bonds, might easily be overcome by an
appropriate provision in the trust agreement, such as is found
in English and Canadian issues and to an increasing extent in
our own. This seems never to have been attempted. The rea-
sons are largely that before the war the country enjoyed a wave
of prosperity and such difficulties were not envisaged. Nor were
German lawyers sufficiently familiar with such provisions in
other countries to be ready for the innovation.2 Finally, it
must be remembered that the German trust indenture is a short
typewritten document in which nothing but bare essentials ap-
pear, and the insertion of such a revolutionary provision would
have had unwelcome prominence. The danger of unusual clauses
is especially important since the war, where the competition for
capital investment is excessive, and their introduction might im-
pair the saleability of the bonds.
German writers are by no means agreed that the effect of
this statute has been uniformly for good. The general consensus
is clearly that the statute itself is desirable, and the immediate
application of it shortly after its passage in the mortgage bank
instances showed the decided advantage of the presence of such
a statute even where it was necessary to secure deposits of the
bonds to accomplish the desired reorganization. But the remark
of the editor of Saling's Boersenpapiere holds good:
"Despite the precautions offered by the statute it is by no
means certain that bondholders' meetings adopt resolutions
which in fact correspond with the interests of the bonds. Rather
it is conceivable that with a severe market depression bonds are
bought up by other interests and used for improperly influencing
the bondholders' meeting." 50
This is somewhat vague; specifically, it means that interests
close to the company might buy these bonds and exert pressure
at the meeting.
CREDITORS' REORGANIZATIONS
Before the war, reorganizations in which sacrifices were made
by general creditors were very scarce. And many of the excep-
54 Compare Siemens Elektrische Betriebe, discussed supra. notes 50 and
51.
55 The only variation from the norm that the vriter has been able to
discover in these indentures is a waiver by the bondholders of their statu-
tory right to security (Commercial Code, § 289) in case the capital stocl:
is reduced.
SG 1 SALING, BOERSENPAPIERE (1926) 87.
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tions turn out upon examination to have special reasons. Such
was the surrender of part of its claim against the Elektrische
Strassenbahn Bamberg by the Commerz u. Disconto Bank,17 since
the total share capital of the former was in the hands of a con-
sortium led by the latter. Such was the action of the Deutsche
Bank concerning the Ufa after the war. 8 Similar reasons prob-
ably account for the surrender of bank claims aggregating two
million marks against the Gewerkschaft Huesten, though how
the banks were compensated is not clear.
The fact is that the treatment of unsecured creditors has been
the sore point in German reorganization. With perfectly feas-
ible methods of dealing with stocks and bonds, and with little
criticism of the provisions made for stocks and bonds in reor-
ganization plans, by either the courts or the press, the absence
of a method for dealing with unsecured creditors produces a cur-
ious anomaly. Institution by the legislature of some device for
binding general creditors by majority agreement was proposed
time and again and always without success.50 This accounts
largely for the scarcity of instances before the war in which
sacrifices were asked of general creditors. In fact, they have
in some cases been treated better than the bondholders, although,
if the company had been liquidated or put into bankruptcy, these
general creditors would have fared very badly. In the reorgani-
zation of the Mecklenburg-Strelitzsche Mortgage Bank there
were four and a half millions of unsecured creditors' claims as
against twenty-five millions of mortgage bonds. The total num-
ber of creditors was too great for any attempt to gather them
together and coerce them into some sort of agreement with the
threat of bankruptcy, and the amount involved in paying them
in full was too large a sacrifice to be faced with equanimity. For
some time this impasse continued, the bondholders making neces-
sary sacrifices to avoid bankruptcy and the company trying to
straighten out its affairs. But it seems that the bonds yielded
in the end and the unsecured creditors were paid in full.
Since 1914, however, conditions have been considerably al-
tered. A half-century's agitation had failed to impress the
government that there was need for a proceeding for settling
with general creditors without resorting to bankruptcy. But
the war made short work of this resistance, and in 1914 a brief
57 See HANDBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN for 1907-8.
58 The reorganization of the Ufa aroused nation-wide interest. Discus-
sions of it may be found in many issues of standard journals, such as the
MIAGAZIN DER WIRTSCHAFT and DEn DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRT during 1927, as
well as the business pages of the newspapers.
59 For a brief history of these attempts see the introduction to Dr. Kie-




act 60 was passed providing for receivership for the avoidance
of bankruptcy. The official justification was the necessity of
continued production, even at the cost of maling the strong en-
terprise support the weak. The receiver, who was appointed by
the court, might be endowed by it with considerable power over
the conduct of the debtor; otherwise everything continued as
before, with the exception that creditors were compelled to wait
until the debtor was in a position to pay. No terminus for the
receivership was set, nor was any foreseen other than the end of
the war.
Despite the anticipated repeal when peace should be restored,
the act retained its form, with minor changes,1 for nine years.
This was due in large measure to the curative effect of inflation,
which removed insolvency ithout any effort of the debtor. But
in February, 1924,62 a limit of one year was set upon the length
of a receivership, among other amendments; and in June, 1924,c3
further changes were made. These show a considerably altered
viewpoint. Whereas in the earlier legislation it was considered of
the utmost importance to limit public knowledge of the fact of
receivership, the new order provides for publishing the granting
and the ending of the receivership as well as the name of the re-
ceiver. An expert or a government body must be consulted about
the advisability of the receivership. A creditors' committee, with
definite powers, must be appointed. The length of the receiver-
ship was again shortened.
Even ini this guise the business world persisted in regarding
this act as war legislation, to be supplanted as soon as the
weightier affairs of the post-war readjustment were taken care
of. But it is interesting to note the different character of the
reorganizations that took place during this period. Although
the time for its application was comparatively short, we have
in this period a number of instances of sacrifices made by
creditors in the course of reorganization. A proposal made by
the Mauls Kakao u. Schokoladenfabrik to reduce its paper mark
capital of 63 million to three million, of which five-sixths was to
go to creditors in satisfaction of claims (par value stock for 80%
of the face amount of the claims), the small creditors being paid
in cash, was objected to both by the creditors' committee and by
the press. The latter insisted that unless creditors are paid in
6o Anordnung einer Geschaeftsaufsicht -ur Abwcwadug des Konfurses,
REICHSGESETZBLATT (1914) 327 et scq.
61 Verardnung deo Bundesrats uber die Geschaeftsaufsicht zur Abwen-
dung des Konkurseg, REICHSGESETZBLA T (1916) 1303 et scq. The tent as
amended in 1924 is reprinted in 107 SAMAILUNG 'DEUTSCflER GEsErzE. See
CAHN, GESCHAEFISAUFSICHT UND ZWANGST=asLE.CH (1917) and SUPPLE-
BIENT (1924); JAEGER, DIE GESCHAEFTSAUFSICHT NEUER 0RDNUNG (1917).
621 REICHSGESETZBLATT (1924) 51 et seq.
c3 Ibid. 641 et seq.
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full stockholders should receive nothing. But the company was
in receivership so that by the terms of the statute the creditors
could not even force liquidation, and hence they were compelled
to accept these terms. This was especially severe, not only in
that the claims were funded, but that a part of them was sur-
rendered entirely.
Almost the same situation was present in the case of the
Mollwerken A. G. in Chemnitz, in the business of auto manufac-
ture and metal work, with the exception that here the creditors
were given 70 per cent of their claims in 8 per cent preferred
stock. In these two cases, however, the stockholders won Pyr-
rhic victories since both companies became bankrupt in a short
time. In the A. G. Neptunschiffwerft u. Maschinenfabrik the
impression is created that creditors were equally hard-hit, since
the capital of 500,000 was reduced to 100,000 and then increased
by 1,900,000 to take care of the unsecured debts. But here there
were only two large creditors so that in effect thd sop of 100,000
thrown to the old stockholders was merely a slight payment for
complacence in the readjustment. Any other legal device for
getting rid of them would have cost much more. But the Aquila
A.G. reorganization belongs with Mauls Kakao and Mollwerken
except that here the creditors received their 70 per cent in cash.
Much more complex than any of these was the readjustment
of the Hannoversche Waggonfabrik A.G. A considerable amount
of surplus land was sold to the city of Hannover; some shares in
the company were sold to another Hannover company; a debt
secured by mortgage and held in Holland was renewed. A large
claim by a Hannover bank was settled by transferring to the
bank the company's claim against the government for war repa-
rations. After a stock reduction new stock was issued to the un-
secured creditors, including part of the bank claims. The re-
mainder of the bank claims were extended and secured by the
entry of a second mortgage. The government was induced to
waive part of the unpaid taxes and extend the time of the rest.
The result was to provide enough money for preferred claims
and leave some working capital.
It is, of course, difficult to say that the reorganizations of
post-war Gelmany offer a parallel to the pre-war cases. It may
be that the losses were more severe and that the sacrifices credi-
tors were called upon to make in the later reorganizations would
simply have meant bankruptcy in the earlier days when the per-
suasive force of the receivership was lacking. And the fact that
two of these companies did go into bankruptcy shortly afterward
would indicate that the little reserved by the stockholders was
worth even less. It is not a question of the merit of the general
creditors' claims, since sometimes they have a tactical advantage
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over mortgage bonds, but of the difference which legal machinery
makes upon, the course of reorganization.
Of course there are cases, and they are well known in this
country, where the creditors have been forced to accept sacri-
fices which went to the partial advantage of stockholders, and
which were unjustified. That this has been to some extent the
situation in Germany is attested by the constant criticism to
which the receivership act was subjected, and by its recent
change. The new act, which went into effect in July, 1927,"
differs widely from its predecessors. Instead of being a lax de-
vice by means of which a declining business might put its credi-
tors at bay, it aims to be the minimum possible concession to a
worthy but unfortunate debtor. The application for receivership
must be accompanied by a scheme of settlement with creditors,
which must already have been assented to by the majority of
them. If the proposal is for a cash settlement, not less than
thirfty per cent must be offered. If the application should be
denied or the receivership terminated by the court for cause,
or for failure to get the required majority of creditors in favor
of the compromise, the court must regard the application for
receivership as automatically converted into one for bankruptcy.
These novel provisions are due in part to new sentiments; there
was a feeling that reorganization as distinct from liquidation
helped to maintain prices, and was in some instances not to the
interest of the public," even though the individual debtor and
6 Gesetz ueber den Vergteich zur Abwzczduzg des Konkhurscs, 1 REICls-
GESETZBLATT (1927) 139 et seq.
rs This criticism of the effect of reorganization is based solely on short-
term tendencies and the fact that a receivership keeps a stock of goods,
which would otherwise be sacrificed, from being thrown on the market.
In this form the criticism may be conceded. The long-term tendency of
reorganization on price structure is something that we at present know
very little about. A first reaction might be that reorganization, by main-
taining a competitor in the industry, increased the volume of production
and helped to lower prices. This reaction may, however, be false; at least
two things to the contrary suggest themselves. The first is that a reor-
ganized company is likely to write down its assets to an extremely low
figure and thereby show an apparently small overhead cost for the future.
This may have the effect of producing excessive competition and eventual
disruption of the market, with a later return to a higher price level when
the weaker competitors depart from the field. The period of disruption,
whatever the ultimate effect on prices, is deplorable. The second suggestion
is based on a supposed tendency of prices to become more or less stratified
at a level just sufficient for the intra-marginal producer. If he should
be removed in those cases where he falls below the margin, the stimulus
to competition produced by a drive for his old customers may cause fluc-
tuation and increased production on the part of more favorably situated
enterprises, which eventually result in a lower price level. The last point
to be considered is the possibility that the continued presence of the mar-
ginal producer tends to make the total supply so large and the outlook
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his creditors might fare better than in liquidation or bankruptcy.
This was quite apart from the feeling that creditors were often
injured; the fact is that from 1919 to 1924 the number of com-
panies in receivership was only slightly behind the number in
bankruptcy, and in 1924, the most difficult year of all, the new
receiverships actually surpassed the cases where bankruptcy pro-
ceedings were instituted.
That this statute will diminish appreciably the number of
companies applying for receivership is probable. Whether it
will materially restore the situation before the war, and make
a creditors' reorganization almost impossible, is not clear. There
is a provision in the act which invalidates executions made with-
in thirty days of the opening of the receivership. This m4y prove
to be a powerful weapon in persuading creditors who have not
been fortunate enough to seize part of the property to consent
to the receivership application. Some of the provisions may,
however, turn out to be unwise; for example, the requirement
of thirty per cent if a cash settlement is offered can be easily
evaded if another form of settlement is proposed, and may work
to the disadvantage of creditors who wish to avoid bankruptcy
but see no possibility of securing thirty per cent in cash.
INVOLUNTARY REORGANIZATION
The type of reorganization most familiar in America, one
which includes receiverships, judicial sales, and upset prices, is
almost unknown in Germany, as is sufficiently evident from the
foregoing. The few exceptions arise out of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. For reasons similar to those which make reorganiza-
tion through our bankruptcy courts comparatively undesirable,",
sale or liquidation is the more likely procedure. In the excep-
tional case it may happen that a banking group interested in the
property will come forward and strive to make some arrange-
ment.
The only instance of this kind that deserves mention is that
of the Deutsche Grundschuld Bank. This company was a sub-
sidiary of the Prussian Mortgage Bank and was formed chiefly
for the purpose of taking over the more dubious investments of
the latter. It was naturally in worse straits when the crash
came. Since no arrangements to avoid bankruptcy were possible,
the company was declared bankrupt. The disentanglement of its
for a newcomer so poor that the opening of new enterprises in the par-
ticular industry is discouraged. Unfortunately, no detailed consideration
of any of the foregoing is yet to be had though HAMILTON AND WRIGHT,
THE: CASE OF BITUMINOUS COAL (1927) 155, 187-8, have some comment
and VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923), suggests a general approach.
66 See Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES
OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917) 160-1.
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affairs required, however, far more time than could possibly be
granted under the bankruptcy statute; and some bankruptcy ]aw
requirements 17 were practically out of the question without ruin-
ous sacrifices. This led the banking group to obtain deposits of
the greater portion of the bonds. The banks bought the property
from the trustee at the price which in the fatter's opinion could
be realized by slow liquidation."5 The bondholders were given
the choice of taking new securities or their distributive share
of the sale price. Most of them chose the former, and the reor-
ganization ultimately turned out to be more simple than the
state of the company and the novelty of the procedure would
have led one to predict.
Such procedure is, however, extremely rare. The more com-
mon cases are hardly reorganizations in the sense with which
we are familiar. For example, the bondholders of one enter-
prise voted to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale,
to pay dissenting bondholders their distributive share of the
purchase price, and to hold the property until it could be dis-
posed of. This hardly suggests the pattern of reorganization,
since the measures envisage ultimate liquidation of the interests
of the old security-holders and the object is simply to postpone
the liquidation to a more favorable date.
Reorganization by meeting and resolution is therefore almost
as widespread in Germany as it is in England. The only excep-
tion is in the treatment of general creditors, where the procedure
is correspondingly complicated. In a number of obvious respects
this simplicity is distinctly advantageous as compared with the
more elaborate routine in American reorganizations, especially
those of railroads. There are, however, drawbacks to which
one may well call attention because of their home moral. The first
and most important is that the practice of reorganization without
the aid of the court leaves the outvoted party without practical
67 Such as sale entirely for cash, e.\tremely difficult with real eztate.
68 The trustee counted on realizing 40 per cent if 5 years were allowed.
Total debts amounted to 97.6 millions, which makes practically the 37.94
bid by the committee.
69 This instance happens to involve a shipbuilding~company. Examples
are very hard to find since they achieve little publicity and must be
gathered from the recollection of business men and lawyers.
A somewhat similar case was the foreclosure of the Ver. Dampfziegeleien
mortgage. Bonds amounting to 840,000 marks were transferrcd to a ban]:
consortium which in turn created a new company to hold the bonds. The
other bondholders were offered 15 per cent in cash by the banks. -The new
company bid in the property at a very low figure, but the sale was held
invalid by the court on account of the inadequacy of the price. See article
by Landesmann in Din BAxK (1916) 485 et seq. For a discusion of the
law relating to, inadequacy of price in foreclosure sales in Germany and
its lack of efficacy, see NUSSBAULI, DIE ZWANGSVMSERIGMEUNG (191G), and
compare Weiner, op. cit. supra note 11, at 133 et scq.
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opportunity to have the fairness of the plan tested by a court,
the only apparently impartial arbiter provided by our legal and
industrial system. This defect has been met in England by re-
quiring the approval of a court to a plan of reorganization before
it can be put into effect. Judicial approval is required by our
more cumbersome procedure, especially in its recent develop-
ments. But neither the German procedure nor reorganization
under majority clauses in trust indentures provide an adequate
substitute. That independent collateral attack by a bill for in-
junction or the like affords such a substitute will hardly be main-
tained.
Another major drawback lies, paradoxically, in the very ease
with which reorganization can be effected. Perhaps the most
valid defence of the American procedure is that its delay enables
the facts of the failure and the possibilities for the future to be
thoroughly canvassed. It enables the plan of reorganization to
be thrashed out, with regard both to adequacy and fairness.
There is little excus for requiring creditors to make sacrifices
if the enterprise is to go bankrupt shortly afterward. And the
number of instances of recurrent failure, some with ultimate
liquidation, which appear in the history of German reorganiza-
tion, are a by-product of simplicity that is deplorable from any
point of view.
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
Like all bas-reliefs, our outline has failed to give a full picture
of the process of change represented by reorganization. Much
space could be devoted to the conversion of an ambitious and
far-flung enterprise into one of humbler mould. Thus the Ufa,
the great German motion picture company, was forced to sell
its chain of splendid theatres (especially the Vaterlandpalast
and the Gloriapalast in Berlin), and devote itself solely to pro-
ducing. 0 Many others have paid the same penalty for ambition,
and have been compelled to drop appendages more or less vital to
the main enterprise.71 Still others have had to release prized
70 Besides supplying new money the sales helped the reorganization ma-
terially in that the former was sold for a book gain of 3V:5 million marks,
the latter for a gain of 1 million.
T' The Hannoversche Waggonfabrik, discussed supra page 766. One of the
most notable reorganizations before the war was that of the Gewerkschaft
Huesten. Just prior to the first reorganization, this company was com-
pelled to lease its chemical plant, though it was part of the contemplated
program of manufacture of the company. A somewhat different pressure
existed in the case of the Bergwerkgesellschaft von Giesches Erben. This
more than two hundred year old company owned coal, zinc, and lead mines
in Silesia and elsewhere. Many of these holdings fell in Polish territory
by the peace treaty, with the result that enormous pre-war profits dis-
appeared. New money was advanced by the Harriman group and by a
German bank, the Preussag. The Anaconda Company offered to reorganize
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blocks of securities, carrying perhaps important advantages in
integration.72 Mlost dramatic of all are those cases where the
original controlling group sees the management pass into other
hands.73 This may happen even to powerful interests if caught
in a time of storm and stiess.
74
Another chapter in reorganization might be written about
those companies whose history terminates more or less inglor-
iously, by fusion with a more durable friend or competitor. The
unfortunate Dortmunder Union fuer Bergbau was founded in
1872 by a powerful consortium led by the Discanto Gesellschaft.
After an eventful history which included several reorganizations
and a sale of one of its mines, it was finally merged in 1910
with Deutsch-Luxembourg (now the United Steel Works).
Similarly, the Vereinigte Annweiler A. G., whose stock was
closely held, reduced its preferred to eight shares and its common
to five shares, to be exchanged for a like amount with the merg-
ing company. Other instances, large and small, might be added.
Finally, there is a type of reorganization not often met with in
this country, that of the affiliated group or Kozzern2. The great
crop of examples here is also post-war, a period which saw the
rout of perhaps the most famous of them, the Stinnes Konzern.
The outcome varies from almost complete liquidation, such as
befell the Stinnes interests, to partial realignments and reorgani-
zation of the individual units which compose the Konzern.
REORGANIZATION SINCE THE WAR
It may prove useful to characterize the trend of reorganization
in Germany today. We have had occasion to refer to some of the
the Polish mines with preferred and common for Giesche and a majority
of the common for Anaconda; also to advance 50 millions to Giesche for
settling its German affairs. Despite the opposition to letting these valuable
mines fall under the control of another country, it was conceded that Amer-
ican interests would fare better in Poland than German. The final clause
in the agreement, that Giesche must for 25 years sell to Anaconda the zinc
products from hitherto unopened fields, aroused more opposition. But the
agreement was adopted. See WnrrSCHAFTSDIENST (1925) 1759.
72 This happens most often in the case of the Konzc,-'a, discussed below.
The sale of the Baroper Walzwerk shares by the Stinnes interests led to a
rescission of the contract between this company and the Stinnes Eisen A. G.
The Gelsenkirchner A. G. of the Stumm Konzern sold all its outside hold-
ings.
73The change in management is not always apparent, since the required
publicity merely indicates that new shares are issued with the stockholders'
preemptive rights excluded. But the tongues of the market-place and of
the financial journals wag.
741n the reorganization of Rheinmetall in 1925, Krupp, the former ma-
jority owner of the stock, was unable to advance the new money, and
therefore lost his position. Otto Wolf, and A.E.G.-Linke-Hofmann-Lauch-
hammer, who were heavily interested, went the same way. As a result,
the Interessengeneinschza.ft (community of interest) with Krupp was dis-
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changes. An outstanding factor was the introduction of receiver-
ship and of devices for control of general creditors by majority
vote. This has been appreciably limited in the act of 1927, but
during the regime of the former act a conspicuous change was
visible. Nor is it at all clear that the new law will not prove
almost as feasible for reorganization as its predecessor.
Another change which can be readily earmarked is the reor-
ganization of the Konzern. This flower of war and inflation by
no means disappeared with stabilization. On the contrary, it is
one of the characteristics of the present organization of German
industry, and seems destined for an important role in the era
which is already beginning to be called Spgtk pitalismus. The
introduction of management shares, multiple voting shares, and
the like considerably strengthens its future. But some of the
unhealthiest blooms have paid the penalty of too-rapid expansion,
and others are almost certain to follow.
By and large, however, the most significant change lies not in
these. Reorganizations in post-war Germany have been far
more frequent than promotions. And yet in the constant variety
thus presented, the outstanding characteristic is the effect upon
the small stockholder. With almost no exceptions the smqll
stockholder has not come forward with the new money necessary
to retain his old footing in the corporation. In many cases the
opportunity to do so has not been offered him. This exclusion
is not wilful. The dearth of capital that is perhaps the most
prominent feature of recent German finance has contributed
this by-product to reorganization. The small stockholder lost
what remained to him after the war in the inflation period; with
it he lost also, what is equally important, a good part of that cau-
tious enterprise and careful saving that are the backbone of
small shareholding. Reorganization, therefore, has called loudly
upon the management groups and their friends, the bankers, to
produce the n\v money. After their willingness and ability
were exhausted, the burden fell, especially with the availability
of receivership, on creditors and bondholders. Nor was the large
shareholder always immune, as some of our examples indicate,
but himself surrendered perhaps a dominant position in favor
of some other group fortunate enough to be able to supply cash
or credit. However, despite the numerous instances of this
kind, the fate of the small shareholder is still the dominant char-
acteristic. In all cases he has been forced to recede, in many of
them "beyond the horizon." The effect which such losses have
had upon the distribution of corporate ownership throughout the
country can only be conjectured. The fact of such losses is,
however, interesting as a further illustration of the importance
of reorganization in the capital structure of society.
solved and Rheinmetall abandoned locomotive manufacture. See VnT-
SCHAFTSDIENST (1925) 1757 et seq.
